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EFTA. Under the IFCA claim, the court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court
assessed the statutory text, and cited Kedziora v.
Citicorp Nat'l Servs., 780 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Il1.
1991) for the proposition that a deceptive practice may
be one that is "misleading," and whether or not a
business form is misleading is a question of fact. The

court found that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
direct deposit form misleading. Additionally, the court
declined to find as a matter of law that Cobb did not
suffer damages from the repayment arrangement.
Reconsideration of the matter was denied on June 6,
1996. Cobb v. Monarch Fin. Corp., 1996 WL 308279
(N.D. Ill. June 6, 1996).

Accident victims' right to privacy upheld over
attorneys"free speech rights
by Sara E. Neff
Attorneys must wait 30 days to solicit Texas accident
victims and their families through the mail. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
rejected the proposition that a 30-day ban on attorneys'
direct mail solicitation of accident victims or their
families is unconstitutional in Moore v. Morales, 63
F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995). In an action between attorneys
and various commercial entities and the Attorney
General of Texas, the United States Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's ruling in favor of the
attorneys. The court of appeals concluded that a Texas
statute prohibiting attorneys from direct mail solicitation
of accident victims or their families within 30 days of
the accident advanced Texas' interest in protecting the
privacy of accident victims and their loved ones and did
not violate the attorneys' constitutional right to free
speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refused to address the constitutionality of the
statute as applied to other licensed groups such as
physicians, surgeons, chiropractors, and private investigators. The court noted that other groups have not
challenged the ban.

Texas legislature protects privacy of
accident victims
In 1993, the Texas legislature enacted Texas Penal
Code § 38.12(b)(l), which limits the right of several
groups of licensed professionals, including attorneys, to
solicit accident victims or their families. TEX. PENAL
1996

CODE § 38.12(b)(1) (1994). The provisions of this
statute serve several functions. First, the statute prevents
licensed professionals from soliciting accident victims
directly through the mail until 30 days have passed.
Second, the statute restricts accident report access for
180 days following an accident and prevents solicitation
of criminal and civil defendants through mail until 30
days after the initiation of legal proceedings. In addition,
the statute enables victims to indicate, on the face of the
accident report, whether they wish to be solicited.

District court found 30-day ban on
solicitation unconstitutional
The attorneys challenged the 1993 statute on the
grounds that it violated their right under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
district court agreed, finding that the provisions of the
statute presented an unreasonable impediment to
commercial free speech. Thus, the district court declared
the challenged provisions of the statute unconstitutional.

The 30-day ban must satisfy
constitutional test
On appeal, the court tested the 30-day ban for
constitutionality using the three prong test established in
CentralHudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). In order to hold the 30-day ban on
attorneys' direct mail solicitation of accident victims and
their families constitutional, the court must find (1) a
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substantial interest exists in upholding the statute; (2)
the statute materially advances that interest; and (3) the
statute is drawn sufficiently narrowly to advance that
interest. The Court of Appeals rejected the Texas
attorneys' argument that the state of Texas possessed no
substantial interests and that the 30-day ban did not
advance these interests. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
found that the first two prongs of the CentralHudson
test had been met.
The court based its finding that Texas possessed a
valid interest in protecting the privacy of accident
victims and their families in part on the State's extensive
evidence. The State of Texas established that a large
number of complaints concerning direct mail solicitation. Expert testimony revealed that such solicitation
can be detrimental to the victim or family and that a 30day ban provides protection from the potential detrimental effects of solicitation.
In addition, recipients of the direct mail solicitation
testified that the solicitation "immediately following an
accident outraged them, invaded their privacy, and
contributed to their emotional distress." These individuals stated that, they would have been better able to cope
with the intrusive nature of solicitation had the solicitation taken place after a month following the accident.
Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the state of Texas had an
interest in protecting the privacy of the victims and their
families and that the ban sufficiently protected this
privacy.
The Texas attorneys then argued that the statute failed
to meet the third prong of the CentralHudson test
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because the statute was not drawn too narrowly. The
attorneys argued that Texas accident victims already
possessed a way to curb solicitation because the victims
could indicate that they did not want to be solicited on
the accident report. However, the court rejected this
argument for two reasons. First, the fact that a victim
can indicate he or she does not want to be solicited
neither protects the family of the victim nor does it
protect the victim if the victim is injured to the extent
that he or she cannot sign the report. Second, the court
indicated that the State is not required to use the "least
restrictive means in promoting its interest." The third
prong only requires that the regulation's restrictions be
reasonably tailored to fit the desired objective. The
court ultimately found this requirement to be satisfied.

Attorneys can exercise free speech after
30 days
In conclusion, having satisfied all three prongs of the
CentralHudson test, the Moore court declared the
statute constitutional. The court held that a solicitation
ban is an appropriate means to protect Texas victims'
right to privacy. Beware attorneys: you may not solicit
accident victims in Texas directly through the mail until
the 3 1st day after an accident.
Editor'sNote: On February 20, 1996, a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was denied. Ventura v. Morales, 116
S. Ct. 917 (1996).
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